WINTHROP, Judge.
¶ 1 The Committee for Justice and Fairness ("CJF") is a national political organization that operates primarily for the purpose of influencing state and local elections. In 2010, CJF financed the creation and dissemination of an advertisement broadcast on a Phoenix-area television station immediately before the general election. The ad attacked the record of one of the two candidates for Attorney General, Tom Home. After learning CJF had failed to follow Arizona's registration and disclosure requirements applicable to political committees that raise and spend money to influence the outcome of an election in Arizona, see generally Ariz. Rev.Stat. ("A.R.S.") §§ 16-901 to -925,
¶ 2 After an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") recommended MCAO's order be upheld, the Maricopa County Attorney issued a Final Decision ordering CJF to register as a political committee and comply with the applicable campaign reporting and disclosure requirements. The superior court reversed and vacated the recommended order and Final Decision after concluding (1) the ad was not subject to Arizona's disclosure requirements because it was merely issue-oriented speech rather than express advocacy, and (2) the disclosure statutes at issue are unconstitutional.
¶ 3 In this opinion, we conclude CJF's advertisement qualifies as "express advocacy" as defined in A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a), the advertisement qualifies as an independent expenditure designed to influence the 2010 Attorney General election, and CJF is a political committee that must comply with Arizona's political committee registration and disclosure requirements. We also conclude the superior court erred in finding the applicable statutes unconstitutional. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the superior court's judgment holding unconstitutional A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(1) and the now-repealed subpart (b) of § 16-901.01(A)(2), and reverse the remainder of the court's judgment.
¶ 4 In 2010, shortly before the November general election, CJF caused to be broadcast on Phoenix area Channel 12 a television advertisement regarding Tom Home, one of the two candidates for Attorney General. At the time, Home was still the Superintendent for Public Instruction. The advertisement claimed that (1) when Home was a state legislator, he had "voted against tougher penalties for statutory rape,"
¶ 5, On October 21, 2010, Home filed suit in Maricopa County Superior Court, seeking a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to enjoin CJF and local television stations from airing the advertisement. Based on Pacion v. Thomas, 225 Ariz. 168, 236 P.3d 395 (2010), and the exclusive remedy set forth in A.R.S. §§ 16-912(E) and 16-924, the superior court denied Home's application for a TRO. See Home v. Committee for Justice & Fairness, Maricopa County Cause No. CV 2010-053307 (order dated Oct. 27, 2010).
¶ 6 Meanwhile, on October 22, 2010, Home's election committee filed with the Arizona Secretary of State a complaint alleging CJF had engaged in express advocacy and was thus subject to the requirements of A.R.S. § 16-901 et seq. The
¶ 7 On October 25, 2010, the Arizona Secretary of State issued a Reasonable Cause Notice, stating there was reasonable cause to believe CJF had violated A.R.S. §§ 16-902 and 16-912. The Arizona Secretary of State notified the Attorney General of that finding. Home was ultimately elected Attorney General, and to avoid any conflict of interest, the Arizona Attorney General's Office requested by letter dated January 26, 2011, that MCAO assume enforcement and litigation of the matter.
¶ 8 On May 23, 2011, MCAO issued an Order Requiring Compliance to CJF pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-924. The order required CJF to do the following: (1) register as a political committee with the Arizona Secretary of State, (2) notify the Secretary of State of CJF's designated financial institutions, (3) file the required campaign finance reports, (4) provide financial records reflecting the cost of producing the advertisements, (5) comply with the requirements of Arizona's campaign finance laws, and (6) comply with the request for financial records. As permitted in A.R.S. § 16-924(A), CJF requested a hearing, and MCAO forwarded that appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing.
¶ 9 On August 31, 2011, the ALJ held an administrative hearing, and on September 23, he issued a Decision, supported by his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ determined in part that (1) CJF had made expenditures that expressly advocated against the election of Home, (2) CJF is a political committee as defined by A.R.S. § 16-901(19), (3) CJF violated A.R.S. § 16-902.01(A) by failing to register as a political committee, (4) CJF was required to file campaign finance reports pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 16-913, -915, and -918, (5) CJF's failure to do so violated A.R.S. § 16-913, and (6) CJF had violated A.R.S. § 16-904(J) by failing to respond to MCAO's request for financial records reflecting the cost for the production of the television advertisement. The ALJ's Decision recommended MCAO's May 23, 2011 Order Requiring Compliance be affirmed and upheld, and CJF be ordered to register as a political committee and comply with the applicable campaign reporting and disclosure requirements. On October 17, 2011, the Maricopa County Attorney issued a Final Decision accepting and adopting the ALJ's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended order.
¶ 10 CJF filed a complaint in the Maricopa County Superior Court seeking judicial review of the Maricopa County Attorney's October 17 Final Decision accepting and adopting the ALJ's September 23 Decision. See A.R.S. §§ 12-124(A), -904(B), -905(A), 16-924(C). After briefing by the parties and oral argument, the superior court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 11 In a minute entry filed October 11, 2012, the superior court reversed and vacated the recommended order of the ALJ and the Final Decision of the Maricopa County Attorney. The superior court concluded (1) the advertisement "was issue-oriented speech and not `express advocacy,'" (and thus CJF was not required to register or file financial reports), and (2) "A.R.S. §§ 16-901, -901.01, -902.01, -913, and related statutes are unconstitutional."
¶ 12 On November 28, 2012, the superior court entered its final judgment in favor of CJF, including an award of costs and attorneys' fees. The final judgment identified only the following provisions of Arizona's campaign finance laws as unconstitutional: (1) the portion of A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(1) that includes the phrase "or a campaign slogan or words that in context can have no
¶ 13 The Arizona Secretary of State and MCAO filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-913 and 12-2101(A)(1).
¶ 14 In its opening brief, MCAO raises two issues for review: (1) whether CJF qualifies as a political committee that must comply with Arizona's political committee registration and disclosure requirements, and (2) whether Arizona's disclosure requirements are constitutional.
¶ 15 Subsection (C) of A.R.S. § 16-924 makes the Administrative Review Act ("ARA"), see A.R.S. §§ 12-901 to -914, applicable here. As such, we rely on cases under the ARA relating to actions by executive branch agencies. In this case, the superior court's scope of review was circumscribed by A.R.S. § 12-910(E):
¶ 16 Thus, in reviewing an administrative decision, the superior court examines whether the challenged action was illegal, arbitrary, capricious, or involved an abuse of discretion. See Gaveck v. Ariz. State Bd. of Podiatry Exam'rs, 222 Ariz. 433, 436, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d 1114, 1117 (App.2009); Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev. Corp. v. Desert Valley Wood Prods., Inc., 167 Ariz. 383, 386, 807 P.2d 1119, 1122 (App.1990). The superior court defers to factual findings supported by substantial evidence, and may not substitute its own judgment where factual questions and substantive expertise are involved. See Gaveck, 222 Ariz. at 436, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d at 1117 ("If an agency's decision is supported by the record, substantial evidence exists to support the decision even if the record also supports a different conclusion." (citing DeGroot v. Ariz. Racing Comm'n, 141 Ariz. 331, 336, 686 P.2d 1301, 1306 (App.1984))).
¶ 17 On appeal, we determine whether the record contains evidence to support the superior court's judgment, and in so doing, we also reach the underlying question of whether the administrative entity acted in contravention of the law, arbitrarily, capriciously, or in abuse of its discretion. Saldate v. Montgomery, 228 Ariz. 495, 498, ¶ 10, 268 P.3d 1152, 1155 (App.2012); accord Sanders v. Novick, 151 Ariz. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 960, 962 (App.1986). In administrative appeals, neither the superior court nor this court reweighs the evidence. St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 185 Ariz. 309, 312, 916 P.2d 499, 502 (App. 1996) (citing Havasu Heights, 167 Ariz. at 387, 807 P.2d at 1123). Nevertheless, "[w]hether substantial evidence exists is a question of law for our independent determination." Gaveck, 222 Ariz. at 436, ¶ 12, 215 P.3d at 1117 (citations omitted). Furthermore, we review de novo the legal issues, including those involving statutory interpretation. Id.; Kromko v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 499, 501, ¶ 4, 47 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App. 2002).
¶ 18 MCAO argues that CJF qualifies as a political committee that must comply
¶ 19 Title 16, Chapter 6, of the Arizona Revised Statutes provides the statutory framework for the regulation of "Campaign Contributions and Expenses" in Arizona. Under A.R.S. § 16-902.01(A), "[e]ach political committee that intends to accept contributions or make expenditures of more than five hundred dollars shall file a statement of organization ... before accepting contributions [or] making expenditures." Additionally, a political committee making an expenditure for an advertisement expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate "shall be registered pursuant to this chapter at the time of distribution [or] placement ... and shall include on the ... advertisement the words `paid for by' followed by the name of the committee that appears on its statement of organization or five hundred dollar exemption statement." A.R.S. § 16-912(A); see also A.R.S. § 16-902.01(A) (providing for registration of political committees). If the expenditure for a political committee's advertisement is an independent expenditure, see infra ¶ 23, the political committee must also "include on the ... advertisement the names and telephone numbers of the three political committees making the largest contributions to the political committee making the independent expenditure." A.R.S. § 16-912(B). Other disclosure requirements apply for political committees as well. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 16-902 (providing requirements for the organization of political committees); -902.01(B) (listing the required contents of a statement of organization); -902.02 (addressing registration and initial reporting of out-of-state political committees); -904 (providing the duties of a political committee's treasurer); -913 (requiring the filing of campaign finance reports).
¶ 20 Under A.R.S. § 16-901(19), a political committee is defined in pertinent part as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 21 In this case, the ALJ found that CJF, whose business office is in Washington, D.C. and primary financial contributor is the Democratic Attorneys General Association ("DAGA") located in Denver, Colorado, is a political organization as defined by the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. § 527, and that, in its 2009 Form 90-EZ filed with the Internal Revenue Service, CJF acknowledged, as its "primary exempt purpose," that it operates "for the purpose of accepting donations in order to make disbursements... to indirectly influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of individuals to state or local public office."
¶ 22 CJF cannot and does not dispute that it is a political organization, or that it spent money to create and disseminate the advertisement in question. Nevertheless, CJF argues, and the ALJ found, that nowhere in the advertisement is there a specific reference to Home as a candidate, and the advertisement does not mention any other candidate, election, or political party. CJF therefore maintains it should not be required to register as a political committee and comply with the disclosure requirements because its advertisement was merely an "issue-oriented television ad" designed to advocate "for America's middle-class families" and did not qualify as political activity designed to influence the impending election for Attorney General.
¶ 23 MCAO argues, however, that CJF's advertisement qualifies as an independent expenditure designed to influence the 2010 Attorney General election. An independent expenditure is defined in pertinent part as follows:
A.R.S. § 16-901(14) (emphasis added).
¶ 24 The parties' argument revolves around the "expressly advocates" language of A.R.S. § 16-901(14) and whether the advertisement qualifies as "express advocacy." See also A.R.S. § 16-912. If so, CJF concedes it would be subject to the political committee registration and disclosure requirements. As pertinent here, in 2010, A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A) defined the term "expressly advocates" as follows:
A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A) (emphasis added).
¶ 25 In this case, CJF's advertisement clearly did not use any of the "magic words" listed in A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(1), and MCAO does not appear to argue the advertisement contained a campaign slogan or similar words that would qualify as express advocacy under the remainder of subsection (A)(1).
¶ 26 In his conclusions of law, the ALJ concluded that "CJF's advertisement constituted express advocacy pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)." Although not bound by the ALJ's legal conclusion, we nevertheless agree with his conclusion and note the factual findings underpinning his reasoning are supported by substantial evidence. As the ALJ recognized:
¶ 27 These facts meet the test for express advocacy under A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a). The broadcast medium utilized by CJF for its public communication, Phoenix television Channel 12, which broadcasts in the greater Phoenix metropolitan area and beyond, clearly targeted a major portion of the electorate for the statewide office of Attorney General, and it did so within days of the election. In fact, nothing in the record indicates it would have been possible to more narrowly target such a significant portion of the electorate for that office.
¶ 28 Further, although CJF argues Home was not a "clearly identified candidate" because the advertisement did not specifically identify him as a candidate for Attorney General, no question exists that Home was in fact a "clearly identified candidate" as defined under Arizona's statutory scheme. "`Clearly identified candidate' means that the name, a photograph or a drawing of the candidate appears or the identity of the candidate is otherwise apparent by unambiguous reference." A.R.S. § 16-901(4). Accord 11 C.F.R. § 100.17. In the advertisement promulgated by CJF, Home was identified through his name, photographs, and his prior and then-current public offices. Moreover, by the time the advertisement was run, Home had been clearly identified to the general populace as the Republican candidate for Attorney General. It was unnecessary for the advertisement to further identify the position he sought.
¶ 29 Finally, as the ALJ noted, the advertisement criticized Home's past actions both
¶ 30 In sum, CJF as a political organization made a general public communication in a broadcast medium referring to a clearly identified candidate and targeted to the electorate of that candidate, that in context could have no reasonable meaning other than to advocate the defeat of that candidate, as evidenced by factors such as the presentation of the candidate in an unfavorable light and the targeting, placement, and timing of the communication. In this case, reasonable minds could not differ as to whether CJF's advertisement encouraged a vote against Home.
¶ 31 MCAO next argues the superior court erred in concluding that A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a) and Arizona's registration and disclosure requirements, which closely parallel federal law, are unconstitutional. CJF maintains Arizona's definition of express advocacy under A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a) is unconstitutional, and challenges its status as a political committee and the resulting political committee registration and campaign contribution disclosure requirements. We agree with MCAO.
¶ 32 The parties disagree as to the standard of review this court should employ in analyzing the statutes at issue, either "strict scrutiny" or a less stringent "exacting scrutiny" standard. Citing Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. ("WRTL"), CJF argues it was involved in issue advocacy, and the strict scrutiny standard must be applied to any statute attempting to regulate or prohibit such speech. See 551 U.S. 449, 464, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) ("Because [the statute] burdens political speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny.").
¶ 33 In this case, however, because A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a) and the statutes related to it ultimately implicate only disclosure requirements, we apply the exacting scrutiny standard. See Free Speech, 720 F.3d at 792-93; see also N.M. Youth Org. v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 676 (10th Cir.2010) (indicating a challenge to regulations defining a political committee is a challenge to disclosure regulations). Although disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, they "impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities," and "do not prevent anyone from speaking." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366, 130 S.Ct. 876 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 201, 124 S.Ct. 619). The Supreme Court subjects disclosure and disclaimer requirements to exacting scrutiny, which requires the government to demonstrate "a `substantial relation' between the disclosure requirement and a `sufficiently important' governmental interest." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-67, 130 S.Ct. 876 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66, 96 S.Ct. 612; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 231-32, 124 S.Ct. 619); accord Real Truth About Abortion ("RTAA") v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 681 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir.2012) ("[A]n intermediate level of scrutiny known as `exacting scrutiny' is the appropriate standard to apply in reviewing provisions that impose disclosure requirements, such as the regulation and policy." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 841, 184 L.Ed.2d 705 (2013); Human Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir.2010) (citing Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1477, 179 L.Ed.2d 302 (2011).
¶ 34 Moreover, CJF's reference to Citizens United for its argument in favor of the application of strict scrutiny is misplaced. See RTAA, 681 F.3d at 549. CJF notes the Citizens United majority's reference to "onerous restrictions" on political action committee speech, which would ordinarily be subject to strict scrutiny, see 558 U.S. at 337-40, 130 S.Ct. 876, and argues that Arizona's statutory scheme is similar to the one in Citizens United. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized, however, the Supreme Court in Citizens United "distinguished its application of the strict scrutiny standard to expenditure restrictions from the exacting scrutiny standard applicable to disclosure requirement provisions." RTAA, 681 F.3d at 549. The statutes at issue in this case do not prevent anyone from speaking or impose ceilings on campaign-related activities. See RTAA, 681 F.3d at 554 ("In contrast, [the regulation] does not restrain speech; it only implicates the requirement for disclosing specified information." (emphasis in original)). Accordingly, we apply exacting scrutiny to determine whether the statutes implicating Arizona's registration and disclosure requirements are constitutional.
¶ 35 CJF challenges on an as-applied and facial basis the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a) under the United States and Arizona constitutions.
¶ 36 Relying on Colorado Ethics Watch ("CEW") v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, 269 P.3d 1248 (Colo.2012), CJF suggests express advocacy cannot permissibly extend beyond the Buckley "magic words" or substantially similar synonyms, as codified in subsection (A)(1) of A.R.S. § 16-901.01. See CEW, 269 P.3d at 1255-57. Recent Supreme Court and federal appellate court decisions, however, have upheld an approach to defining express advocacy not only in terms of Buckley's "magic words" and substantially similar synonyms as recognized in subsection (A)(1), but also their "functional equivalent," as provided in subpart (a) of subsection (A)(2). See Free Speech, 720 F.3d at 794 (citing RTAA, 681 F.3d at 550).
¶ 37 In McConnell, the Supreme Court considered a facial overbreadth challenge to Title II, § 201, of the BCRA, which included a provision defining express advocacy for purposes of electioneering communications. 540 U.S. at 190-91, 124 S.Ct. 619. In rejecting the challenge, the Court noted Buckley's, narrow construction of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to require express advocacy "was a function of the vagueness of the [original] statutory definition of `expenditure,' not an absolute First Amendment imperative." Free Speech, 720 F.3d at 794 (bracketed portion omitted from original) (quoting RTAA, 681 F.3d at 550 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 191-92, 124 S.Ct. 619)). Consequently, the Court held "Congress could permissibly regulate not only communications containing the `magic words' of Buckley, but also communications that were `the functional equivalent' of express advocacy." Id. at 795, 96 S.Ct. 612 (quoting RTAA, 681 F.3d at 550-51 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193, 124 S.Ct. 619)).
¶ 38 In WRTL, the Court adopted a "functional equivalent" test. See Free Speech, 720 F.3d at 795 (citing WRTL, 551 U.S. at 474 n. 7, 127 S.Ct. 2652; RTAA, 681 F.3d at 552). The Court's controlling opinion held "a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." WRTL, 551 U.S. at 469-70, 127 S.Ct. 2652. This test closely correlates to the test set forth in A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a), which provides that a communication "expressly advocates" if it "can have no reasonable meaning other than to advocate the election or defeat of the candidate(s)." See Free Speech, 720 F.3d at 795 (comparing the WRTL test to 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b), which provides that a communication expressly advocates if it "could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s)"). The test provided in A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a) is certainly no broader than WRTL's functional equivalent test. See id.; see also RTAA, 681 F.3d at 552 (refuting a vagueness challenge to 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b)).
¶ 39 Citizens United reaffirmed the WRTL functional equivalent test's constitutionality and provided further support for the use of such a test to define express advocacy. See Free Speech, 720 F.3d at 795. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court applied the WRTL test to determine whether the communication at issue (a film released by Citizens United entitled Hillary: The Movie) would be prohibited by the corporate funding restrictions set forth in Title II of the BCRA. 558 U.S. at 324-26, 130 S.Ct. 876. The Court ultimately concluded that, "[u]nder the standard stated in McConnell and further elaborated in WRTL, the film qualifies as the
¶ 40 CJF's reliance on Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. ("MCFL"), 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986), is also unavailing. In MCFL, the Supreme Court held that a section of the Federal Election Campaign Act prohibiting direct expenditure of corporate funds in connection with any federal election violated the First Amendment as applied to a nonprofit corporation that published a newsletter urging readers to vote "pro-life" and listing approximately 400 candidates for state and federal office in Massachusetts who either supported or opposed the corporation's views. Id. at 241-45, 263-65, 107 S.Ct. 616. CJF speculates the position advocated by MCAO in this case (treating CJF's advertisement as express advocacy subject to Arizona's disclosure requirements) could force issue advocacy groups such as MCFL to register as political committees and be subject to Arizona's disclosure requirements by treating their communications as express advocacy.
¶ 41 MCFL involved whether a nonprofit advocacy group that was engaged in express advocacy could raise and spend general fund money directly on an election. Id. at 249-65, 107 S.Ct. 616. Thus, it was a case challenging a restriction on independent spending as applied to MCFL, see id. at 263-64, 107 S.Ct. 616, not a case directly challenging the constitutionality of disclosure laws, and we see no reason to speculate on the potential overbreadth of A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a) on an as-applied basis to groups other than CJF. Moreover, to the extent the issue is properly before us, A.R.S. § 16-901.01(B) would appear to address a situation such as that posed by CJF:
¶ 42 Consequently, under A.R.S. § 16-901.01(B), a group such as MCFL, which is engaged in independent communications about the voting record or position on a campaign issue of three or more candidates, is not necessarily considered to be one that expressly advocates, even if its communication falls within the scope of A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2).
¶ 43 We also reject CJF's argument that A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a) is impermissibly vague. As the Fourth Circuit noted when considering the propriety of 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b), "cases that fall close to the line will inevitably arise when applying [the statute]. This kind of difficulty is simply inherent in any kind of standards-based test." RTAA, 681 F.3d at 554 (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) ("Close cases can be imagined under virtually any statute. The problem that poses is [not] addressed... by the doctrine of vagueness...."); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399, 50 S.Ct. 167, 74 L.Ed. 508 (1930) ("Wherever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides.")); accord Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Roberts, 753 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1221 (N.D.Fla.2010) ("The fact that `it may be difficult in some cases to determine whether these clear requirements have been met' does not mean that the statute is void for vagueness." (quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 306, 128 S.Ct. 1830)).
¶ 44 Additionally, the mere fact that A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a) identifies certain factors for consideration, most specifically the "timing of the communication," does not mean it is inconsistent with WRTL. See RTAA, 681 F.3d at 554 (examining 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b)'s "proximity to the election" language in light of WRTL). WRTL "simply held that the timing of speech cannot be used as a proxy for a speaker's intent." Id. (citing WRTL, 551 U.S. at 472, 127 S.Ct. 2652 ("To the extent th[e] evidence [regarding the timing of WRTL's ads] goes to WRTL's subjective intent, it is again irrelevant.")). Under both WRTL and subpart (a) of § 16-901.01(A)(2), subjective intent is not a consideration, and as the Supreme Court noted in WRTL, by virtue of their time-sensitive statutory definition, "[e]very ad covered by [the electioneering communication regulation] will... air just before a primary or general election." Id. (citing WRTL, 551 U.S. at 472, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (emphasis in original)). Consequently, although "considering timing with respect to electioneering communications would prove redundant, a limited reference to whether, for example, an ad airs in an election year, would actually help limit the number of communications that are considered independent expenditures." Id. The same is true regarding A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a).
¶ 45 CJF maintains that the possibility citizens or groups might have to register as a political committee and disclose their largest donors could have an impermissible chilling effect on speech. Although the potential exists for disclosure requirements to have an unconstitutional chilling effect on speech if a "reasonable probability" exists an organization or its members may face threats, harassment, or reprisals due to disclosure, see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 197-98, 124 S.Ct. 619; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370, 130 S.Ct. 876, CJF has identified no instance of harassment or retaliation involving CJF or its donors, despite the fact that CJF discloses contributor information through reports filed with the Internal Revenue Service. Additionally, CJF has not presented evidence that it was unfairly targeted by MCAO, or that MCAO or the ALJ had an inherent bias against CJF.
¶ 46 CJF also notes that violations of Arizona's disclosure laws may result in civil or even criminal penalties. See generally A.R.S. §§ 16-904(K), -919(D)-(E), -924(B).
¶ 47 In sum, CJF has failed to show Arizona's disclosure laws are unconstitutional as applied to CJF or that any, much less a substantial number, of the applications of the disclosure laws are unconstitutional. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473, 130 S.Ct. 1577; see also Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 470 n. 1 (7th Cir.2012) (recognizing numerous decisions by federal courts of appeals upholding federal and state disclosure regulations against facial attacks), aff'g 735 F.Supp.2d 994 (N.D.Ill.2010). Accordingly, we find no constitutional infirmity in Arizona's disclosure requirements, including A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(2)(a), both facially and as applied to CJF.
¶ 48 The purpose of a registration requirement is to ensure disclosure. See, e.g., Madigan, 735 F.Supp.2d at 1000 (equating "election-law disclosure requirements" discussed in Citizens United with "registration requirements, including related reporting, record-keeping, and disclosure requirements"). Disclosure serves "substantial governmental interests," including (1) providing voters with information to aid them in evaluating candidates and the sources of a candidate's support, (2) deterring actual corruption and avoiding the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to public light, and (3) providing a means of gathering the data necessary to detect violators. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68, 96 S.Ct. 612; accord McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196, 124 S.Ct. 619 (acknowledging Buckley and recognizing the "important state interests" served by disclosure, including "providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions"); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371, 130 S.Ct. 876 ("The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens... to react to the speech ... in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages."); see also Human Life of Washington, 624 F.3d at 1005-06 (recognizing the "vital provision of information" to voters through disclosure laws "repeatedly has been recognized as a sufficiently important, if not compelling, governmental interest"). The requirement of disclosure in this case is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366, 130 S.Ct. 876.
¶ 49 Citing A.R.S. §§ 12-348 and 12-349, CJF requests an award of its costs and attorneys' fees associated with the preparation of its answering briefs in response to the MCAO and amicus curiae brief of the Citizens Clean Elections Commission ("CCEC"). CJF is not the prevailing party, and the positions set forth in the briefs of MCAO and CCEC were reasonable; accordingly, CJF's request is denied.
¶ 50 We vacate the portion of the superior court's judgment holding unconstitutional A.R.S. § 16-901.01(A)(1) and now-repealed subpart (b) of § 16-901.01(A)(2), and reverse the remainder of the superior court's judgment, including its award of costs and attorneys' fees to CJF. Further, we reinstate the Final Decision of the Maricopa County Attorney requiring CJF to register as a political committee and comply with the reporting requirements of Arizona's campaign finance laws.